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Art and Embodiment: Biological and Phenomenological
Contributions to Understanding Beauty and the
Aesthetic
  Adrienne Dengerink Chaplin
Abstract
Increasing awareness of the crucial and complex role of the
body in making and experiencing art has led to a diverse
range of biological and phenomenological philosophies of art.
The shared emphasis on the role of the body re-connects
these contemporary theories of art to aesthetics' pre-Kantian
origin as a science of sense-perception (aesthesis) and feeling.
Tracing some of the current positions in such diverse thinkers
as Dissanayake, Langer, and Merleau-Ponty, this paper will
examine their shared interest in art as a pre-reflective, nondiscursive mode of knowing, symbolizing, and being-in-theworld. This paper argues that while some biologically based
theories have drawn legitimate attention to the potential role
of art in human evolution, their reductive tendencies need to
be corrected and complemented by both a phenomenological
and a 'symbolic' approach, which situates art in a web of
culturally mediated affective encounters with the world in the
context of a broader horizon that lends it its meaning.
Key Words
art, embodiment, biology, phenomenology, Baumgarten,
Dissanayake, Langer, Merleau-Ponty

1. Introduction: The Body as Site of the Senses
Although the body and its 'objects': saliva, urine, hair, nails,
and so forth, now have a prominent place in contemporary art
and art theory, they are still largely ignored in philosophical
aesthetics. This is somewhat surprising, since aesthetics as a
discipline was originally conceived by its founder, Alexander
Baumgarten (1714-1762), as a science of sense perception, to
be considered as a source of knowing, a scientia cognitionis
sensitivae (a science of knowledge by means of the
senses).[1] Indeed, the father of aesthetics was eager to show
that such 'cognition of the senses' was not, as Spinoza and
Leibniz believed, subordinate to logical knowledge, but
possessed an autonomy and perfection of its own.
Poetry, as Baumgarten argued, with a nod to Descartes, was
able to give us clear and 'con-fused' knowledge, the latter not
to be taken in the sense of 'muddled' or 'fuzzy,' but as 'fused,'
condensed or converging. On his account, poetry has both an
intensive clarity, to the extent that it takes concrete objects or
images as its focus; and an extensive clarity, in so far as it is
able to evoke a wide range of allusions and associations.[2]
Because of these characteristics, poetry and, by extension, all
art is able to provide us with a form of condensed knowledge
that captures our concrete and lived experience in ways that
escape discursive prose.
However, as Richard Schusterman correctly points out, despite
his emphasis on sense-perception Baumgarten did not in fact
take the body seriously. This is because he considered the

higher senses of sight and hearing as not primarily belonging
to the body but belonging to the mind.[3] For him, as it was
to be for Kant, sense perception was first and foremost
associated with mental operations. Working within the
rationalistic, anthropological, mind-body hierarchy of his time,
the body belonged to the inferior realm, pertaining to the
lower needs and appetites, clearly distinguished from the
higher, mental faculties. Whereas the body with its needs and
drives worked according to so-called 'natural' laws, the mind,
including the putatively higher senses of sight and hearing,
belonged to the realm of freedom and imagination. Therefore,
despite his re-evaluation of sense-perception as a legitimate
form of poetic or artistic knowing, Baumgarten still remained
trapped in a dualistic anthropology and never developed a
proper aesthetics of the body.
A similar separation between the body and the mind can be
found in Kant's distinction between a liking for the agreeable,
which is rooted in our sensuous bodily nature, and a liking for
beauty, which is the result of the contemplative mind's
reflection. The liking for the agreeable is 'a liking that is
conditioned pathologically by stimuli' and 'holds for nonrational animals too.'[4] It gratifies our bodily needs and
desires. By contrast, a liking for the beautiful transcends those
bodily desires and is always devoid of interest.
In recent years this attitude to the relation between art, the
senses, and the body has undergone significant changes.
Many of those changes have been informed by recent
developments in cognitive science and evolutionary
psychology. Part of that research consists of an exploration of
the link between our cognitive make-up and the making and
appreciating of art. The underlying assumption shared by
these scholars is that, despite immense historic and cultural
diversity, there is a universal biological basis for these
phenomena. Art, both as a practice and as an experience,
belongs, as it were, to the hardware of human nature.
Philosophers and theorists of art, however, have been slow
and reluctant to follow suit. As Noël Carroll observed in a
recent article, "for over two decades, researchers in the
humanities have resisted universalizing modes of analysis,
such as evolutionary psychology and cognitive science,
preferring, almost exclusively, to historicize artistic
phenomenon in the conviction that, as they say, 'it's culture all
the way down.' "[5] Yet, as Carroll concludes, it is high time
for the humanities and the sciences to come together and
recognize each other's significant contributions to the
understanding of art and aesthetic experience.
In this essay I want to examine three philosophers, Ellen
Dissanayake, Susanne K. Langer, and Merleau-Ponty, who,
each in his or her own way, have drawn on the empirical
sciences in order to develop a theory of art and embodiment
that takes the body seriously. Even though they deal with very
similar issues, because of their very different philosophical
traditions and backgrounds these thinkers are rarely
considered together. I will therefore attempt to create a
dialogue among them that brings out each other's strength
and weaknesses. After a brief exposition of the theories of
Darwin, Edward O. Wilson, and sociobiologists Brett Cooke and

Frederick Turner, I will first look at the work of Ellen
Dissanayake, who has drawn on anthropological research to
develop an evolutionary based philosophy of art based on the
notion of 'making special.' I will then turn to Susanne K.
Langer, who, drawing on geology, physics, and biology,
developed a biologically based cognitive philosophy of art and
mind rooted in the notion of 'symbolization.' Finally, I will
examine the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a practicing
psychiatrist, drew extensively on medical science and empirical
psychology in order to develop a theory of art as a mode of
doing phenomenology. I will then conclude with a comparison
of their respective theories, with respect to the extent that
they are able to enrich our understanding of the embodied
nature of art.
I suggest that while sociobiological and Dissanayake's theories
of art draw legitimate attention to the potential role of art in
human evolution, their reductive tendency needs to be
corrected and complemented by the phenomenological
approach of Merleau-Ponty and the 'symbolic' approach of
Susanne K. Langer. Art, I argue, is not merely a symptom of
human need but a symbolic articulation of our embodied
experience and understanding of the world.
2. Darwin, Sociobiological Theories of Art, and Ellen
Dissanayake
Before discussing Dissanayake's approach to art, it is
important to consider some biological theories of art prior to
her, as her own theory is both informed by these and a
response to them. Writing well over a hundred years ago, in
1885, Charles Darwin was arguably the first to draw an explicit
link between art and biology. Indeed, as he observed, there is
"a widespread pleasure which [the men of all races] take in
dancing, rude music, acting, painting, tattooing and otherwise
decorating themselves."[6] For him, the pleasure in the
ornamental display of the body went hand in hand with the
development of a sense of beauty, not only as seen in
humans, but also in animals. In both cases, the display and
appreciation of bodily beauty is linked to the ability of the
male to charm and attract a suitable female partner, and thus
form part of the process of sexual, rather than natural,
selection.
Indeed, features that may initially have served as benefiting
natural selection, such as the deer's antlers in fighting with
other animals, may eventually serve as objects of beauty
meant to impress and attract a female. However, this should
not be seen as a reduction of beauty to sexual or natural
selection. As Wolfgang Welsch rightly argues against later
sociobiological interpretations, "even if one assumes that
beauty means fitness in a hidden way and that this is
ultimately the reason why the beautiful is esteemed, in no
circumstances can one get around the fact that what the
female appreciates in the first place is the beautiful as such. . .
. It is precisely these aesthetic characteristics that produce the
attraction."[7]. In other words, not only is human aesthetics
irreducible to natural selection; so is animal aesthetics.
Almost a century later, evolutionary zoologist Desmond Morris
picked up Darwin's theme in his The Biology of Art, written
five years before his much better-known The Naked Ape,

arguing that artistic activity is not limited to people. However,
rather than focusing on ornamentation for the purposes of
display and attraction, Morris was intrigued by the pleasure
chimpanzees can derive from the drawing of elementary
patterns and configurations. According to Morris, the animals
became so engrossed in their activities that they even
preferred creating art to being fed. Seeing no real difference
between the chimpanzees' products and the creations of
various forms of abstract art, he concluded that, in principle,
there was thus no difference between human and animal art
making.
Taking this as his cue, Edward O. Wilson, the founder of
sociobiology and author of Sociobiology: the New Synthesis,
concluded that this tendency to manipulate objects and to
explore their uses must therefore be a "a special manifestation
of their tool-using behavior" and, as such, have an adaptive
advantage.[8] And, if so, Wilson argued, the same must be
true for the origin of art in man. Since for more than 99 % of
their history as hunter-gatherers humans made their own
tools, the appraisal of form and skill in their execution must
have played a significant role in the struggle for survival, as
well as have brought social approval. As such, Wilson claims,
both forms of success paid off in greater genetic fitness: a
well-crafted tool is beneficial for survival, and so, of course, is
social approval when it comes to opportunities for
reproduction.
Having made this claim for the skillful production of forms and
shapes, Wilson then applied a similar logic to rites and myths:
By engaging in rituals and by listening to stories and myths
about the origin of the world and other significant events, the
individual experiences a sense of belonging and loyalty to the
community he is born into, thus enforcing his will to contribute
to and, in extreme cases, sacrifice his life for the good of the
whole. To Wilson this proved that rituals and myths have
adaptive value and are essential in the human quest for
survival.
It is this basic theory that both art and beauty play a
significant role in both sexual and natural selection that forms
the basis of two important collections of essays, both
published in 1999: first, Sociobiology and the Arts, edited by
Jan Baptist Bedaux and Brett Cooke, and second, Biopoetics:
Evolutionary Explorations in the Arts, also edited by Brett
Cooke, but this time in conjunction with Frederick Turner.
Sociobiology, as Marcel Roele and Jan Wind define it, following
Wilson, in their introduction to the first book, is "the study of
the biological basis of social behavior, with special emphasis on
the evolutionary points of view."[9] Both books contain
numerous variations and elaborations on the same theme,
from studies of the functions of rock art as enhancing hunting
success, encoding social structures and sacred beliefs, marking
territorial boundaries and so forth, to the aesthetic preferences
of finches, bowerbirds, and humans.
According to one contributor, philosopher Ellen Dissanayake,
one can broadly identify three main approaches within
sociobiology to providing an account of the role of art in
human evolution. In her article, "Sociobiology and the Arts:
Problems and Prospects," she helpfully summarizes these as

follows:
"The first approach follows Darwin and focuses on aesthetic
attraction and preferences. It operates on the assumption that
throughout evolutionary history, humans tend to be more
attracted to those kinds of features in members of the
opposite sex which, in their view, signal vitality and fertility
than those which do not. Conversely, people will go at great
lengths to beautify themselves in order to attract suitable
partners thus guaranteeing themselves the necessary offspring for the survival of the species. Likewise, people tend to
be more attracted to landscapes sceneries which combine land
with lakes, rivers or coastlines than those without. These,
arguably are also beneficial for their biological health and wellbeing and thus for the survival of the species as a whole.
"The second approach, also referred to as 'biopoetics,' differs
from the first in that it tends to focus on the use of particular
themes in art. It points out that most art works 'reflect and
articulate the vital motives and interests of human beings as
living organisms,' such as birth and death, rites of passage,
marriage and so forth. Defenders of biopoetics suggest that
this heightened attention for significant moments in human
lives guarantees the species' ongoing concern with matters of
life and procreation.
"The third approach, finally, focuses on the process of the
production of art and considers the cognitive and physical
educational benefits of artistic creativity. In the same way as,
for instance, the playful behavior of young animals can be
considered as learning ground for later hunting and fighting,
the skills learned in doing art, including manual dexterity and
cognitive ordering and problem solving, might serve other,
more 'serious' survival behavior in adult life. Interestingly, we
may add, this argument is also often enlisted in educational
discussions on the value of music in the school curriculum:
rather than demonstrating its intrinsic worth, the inclusion of
music in the curriculum is often defended on the grounds that
it improves children's mathematical skills."[10]
Although Dissanyake does not deny the value of these various
approaches, she does point out that on the above accounts,
there is no single rationale for seeing art as adaptive. In other
words, it is not possible to identify one particular feature
shared among all the arts that could be considered as serving
adaptive behavior. Conversely, according to her, most of the
above selective benefits could also be achieved by means
other than art. For example, people could do sports or build
things in order to improve their manual dexterity or cognitive
ability, or to impress others for competitive selection.
As she argues extensively in her books, Homo Aestheticus:
Where Art Come From and Why and Art and Intimacy: How
the Arts Began, there is nevertheless one feature in art that
does stand out and cannot be substituted by anything else:
this is the fact that all art involves the 'making [something]
special,' or rather the 'marking of something as special.'
According to Dissanayake, this feature is specific to humans.
Unlike other animals, humans deliberately "artify, by shaping,
embellishing and otherwise fashioning aspects of their world
with the intention of making them more than ordinary."[11]
Every act of art, whether dance, poetry, or song, can thus be

viewed as ordinary behavior made special or extraordinary. By
devoting special attention to important objects and life events
(whether tools, weapons, birth, marriage, death, and so on),
they are thus being treated with care and consideration, and,
because of that, they help ensure that they will be successfully
achieved. Art thus functions as a kind of messageenforcement: Make sure you treat these objects, events, and
beliefs with care and consideration, because if you don't, it will
only be to your lasting detriment and eventual demise!
Although some of these activities may contribute to individual
competitive advantage, Dissanayake is convinced that the arts
have even more to contribute in promoting important concerns
of the group, and that this, in turn, enhances the survival of
the species. One such concern, for instance, is the social
cohesion of communities. In Dissanayake's view, ceremonies
which involve dancing and singing, for instance, tend to
inculcate group values and also promote cooperation,
cohesiveness, and confidence. This, in turn, will also enhance a
group's chances of survival. By their ability to promote
cooperation and solidarity, the arts can contribute to a general
sense of belonging and to the important task of community
building. It is these kinds of benefits for humans' individual
and social well being which, in their particular and unique way,
only the arts can bring about.
Therefore an integral dimension in this process of making
special is the benefit it brings to physical and bodily wellbeing. Whether directly, as in the form of a better coordination
of the body through the rhythmic movements of dance, or
indirectly, in the form of a better sense of identity and
belonging through reading stories, both physical and
psychosomatic well-being enhance the chances of survival,
both for the individual and the group. Put differently, the arts,
whether individual or collectively, promote better well-being all
around.
3. Susanne K. Langer and Symbolization
Some of these views had also been expressed earlier by the
American philosopher Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985).
Although mainly known for her Philosophy in a New Key and
Feeling and Form, Langer's later work, in particular her threevolume Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (1967, 1971, 1982),
contains an extensive and substantial theory of art approached
from an evolutionary biological perspective. Art, for Langer,
plays an important role in the emergence of human feeling and
consciousness. It is a thoroughly bodily affair, which is
fundamentally rooted in sense perception. Aesthetic awareness
is linked to the body's sensory apparatus as it has evolved
from animal sense-stimuli-instinct to human sense-perception.
For Langer, the shift from an instinctive reaction to a
perceptual response parallels the shift from the occurrence of
a sign or symptom to the presentation of a symbol.[12] On
her definition, signs, whether natural or artificial, are part of a
causal network, in which one image, event, or gesture evokes
another, whether by means of association or convention.
Whereas natural signs, such as scars signifying a past wound,
smoke signifying a burning fire, or clouds signaling coming
rain, are symptoms of past, present, or future things or
conditions, artificial signs, such as bells, arrow markings, and

whistles, are humanly constructed signals which indicate
commands, warnings, or things about to happen. Both tend to
elicit a conditioned reflex and are generally meant to be acted
upon.
Symbols, by contrast, do not require a response or action.
Instead, they present conceptions of things. Unlike signs or
signals, symbols are an end in themselves. As she says, "it is
the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly
mean."[13] Names, words, and images are vehicles for the
conception of things in the world and are part of a symbolic
and semantic world that is not primarily instrumental but
conceptual.[14] Commenting on the pleasure young children
experience when learning their first words, she says: "Young
children learn to speak . . . by constantly using words to bring
things into their minds not into their hands."[15]
Although this understanding of symbol as a vehicle for mental
conceptions at first seems to defy a biological understanding of
them, this is not really the case. Especially in her later work,
Mind, Langer was at pains to explain symbols as a product of
the evolution of the mind as it is rooted in bodily sense
experience. But even in Philosophy in a New Key, she had
already stated that even the relatively and seemingly passive
appreciation of meaning is a form of symbolic activity: "The
earliest manifestation of any symbol making tendency . . . is .
. . a mere sense of significance attached to certain objects . .
."[16] This can be conceived as the consolidation of an initial
association of a particular visual or audible phenomenon with
something of significance, either internally, such as a
sensation or feeling, or externally, such as a person or a kind
of food, so that future encounters with that phenomenon recall
the latter. In time, this consolidation leads to a fusion of
sensuous phenomena with their association, whether a verbal
name with its object or a visual expression or gesture with its
meaning.
In general, Langer did not consider words or names but
images as the most prone to becoming symbols or vehicles for
conceptions. She explained that in a brain where the
imagination was just beginning to take on the function of
symbolization, there would be a very lively production of
images that would mingle with each other in a variety of
different ways, so that different images that share some
features fuse into one single image, with an emphasis on
those features, these being stressed while others are being
suppressed. This process allows images to modify each other
and become more simplified. It is precisely this simplification
that forms the basis for the natural process of abstraction.
Indeed, the power of abstract symbolic thinking is ultimately
rooted in the visual image. It is the eventual capacity to
remember and voluntarily recall such mental representations
which, in conjunction with remembered vocal sounds,
contributed to the origin of speech and language.
In Mind, Langer attributed this link between symbol and
symbolized not only to incidental associations between name
and object, but to the way in which a person projects certain
bodily sensations onto an object. Drawing on various
anthropological studies by scholars such as Freud, Margaret
Mead, Mircea Eliade, and Levi-Strauss, and recalling empathy

theories such as those developed by Wilhelm Wundt, Theodor
Lipps, and Robert Vischer, she explored the ability of humans
to project [their] bodily feelings onto physical objects, whether
real or imaginary. From this, she developed the theory that
"projection" is a typically human form of "objectification" of
bodily, sensuous awareness onto external objects, and that
this, in turn, is a prototype of "symbolization":
"The mental act of "projecting" . . . lets the subjective element
. . . be perceived as an external datum, i.e., as a quality
belonging to an independently existing object; and that object,
which thus presents our own sensory feeling to us, is a
primitive symbol . . . Bodily feelings may be the first thing
man projected and thus, all unwittingly, projected to
everything he objectified as material bodies in his world."[17]
Although Langer does not specifically address art in this
chapter, there are, of course, significant implications to be
drawn for aesthetic theories dealing with expression and
empathy: humans project bodily feelings upon the forms they
meet in the world, which then, in turn, take on the "objective
image" of such feelings. This, in short, is precisely what
endows them with "meaning."
The objectification of the subjective sense of balance -- and,
perhaps, of physical tensions generally -- has a natural
counterpart, the subjectification of the protosymbolic object as
an image. . . . On the same principle all other kinesthetic,
thermal, tactual, in short, corporeal feelings are "seen" in the
shapes that meet our eyes, and give such shapes the meaning
of spatial entities . . . [18]
In other words, certain objects contain a "sense of
significance" merely by virtue of their visual appearance. The
same is true, however, for certain sounds. And this, in turn,
forms the basis for speech. As she explained, "[a]esthetic
attraction, mysterious fear, are probably the first
manifestations of that mental function which in man becomes
a peculiar 'tendency to see reality symbolically' and which
issues in the power of conception, and the life-long habit of
speech."[19] Langer held that mere sounds, and in particular
vocal sounds, can hold a sense of significance for humans,
which leads to particular affective responses.[20]
Finally, the same idea can also be applied to the sense of
touch. As she points out, the value of the gradual freeing of
the hands from its motor duties does not, as one might
expect, lie in their increased manipulative powers, but in their
gradual specialization as a sense organ. Providing us with an
evocative description of this new role of the hands she writes:
"the sensory reactions of the skin and underlying structures
are engaged together in the tactile perception of substances:
feelings of pressure and release of pressure, of warm and cold
impingements, pin-pointed encounters with resistance,
oiliness, wetness, and mixtures like sliminess, hairiness,
stickiness. The result is that we have not only a report of
surfaces and edges, but of volume imbued with multimodal,
often nameless qualities."[21]
In other words, in humans, the tactile sensations of, or
'reactions,' to these various substances develop into a typically

human form of sense-perception, which allows those
sensations to stand for more than purely physical encounters
framed in the context of meeting primary needs, such as food,
shelter, or procreation. Rather, it is these reports of 'often
nameless qualities' that make the tactile sensitivity of the
hands the basis for a range of experiences which are typically
referred to as aesthetic:
"like all . . . aesthetic perceptions they meet and merge with
emotional elements which are not current sexual, maternal or
hostile feelings toward other beings, but modes of
consciousness, felt attitudes, which motivate the earliest
artistic expressions, dance and vocalization."[22]
Different sensations of touch create a variety of different
experiences that correspond with subtle nuances of
experiences outside the realm of touch.
The same dynamic also forms the basis for the use of
metaphor, whether in language or in visual imagery. Symbols,
whether words, pictures or gestures, used for tactile
sensations of physical objects can thus be transferred to nonphysical entities, such as character or mood. In other words,
the physical experience, for instance, of warmth or brittleness
can evoke an emotional mood so that the name we use for the
physical experience can be transferred to other realms of
reality, such as persons or moods.[23] It is merely a way of
ordering life so that it can be held and understood. In the
process of symbolization physical, mental, and emotional
aspects of consciousness come together: "Language is born of
the need for emotional expression," says Langer, and it is
meant to "hold the object of feeling," rather than
communicate it.[24]
Through habitual communal appropriation of particular sounds,
the original affective associations fade into the background
while the sounds themselves fuse with their newly acquired
representational meaning. This eventually leads to the
functional and instrumental uses of language that have been
the focus of most communication theories of language. Since
most of our day-to-day language is instrumental, it is only its
poetic use which can prevent people from forgetting the
originally integral connection between name and object.
Langer warned us against such forgetting: "Speech becomes
increasingly discursive, practical, prosaic, until human beings
can actually believe that it was invented as a utility, and was
later embellished with metaphors for the sake of a cultural
product called poetry."[25] The challenge that art and poetry
faces is to remind people of the original and authentic
connection between the representation and what is being
represented, and to keep alive the awareness that our
representations are ultimately symbolic transformations of
human perceptions and experiences.
4. Phenomenological Theories of Art: Merleau-Ponty
This coming together of the physical, mental, and affective, or
the body and consciousness, links Langer's philosophy of art
with the phenomenological aesthetics of the French
philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Influenced by
Heidegger's notions of 'being-in-the-world' and 'facticity' in
Being and Time (1926), Merleau-Ponty developed a fresh

understanding of the 'body-subject's' primordial contact with
the world, rooted in a distinctive notion of 'perception.' As he
explained in his seminal Phenomenology of Perception of 1945,
perception is not a question of deliberately taking up a
position or engaging in a particular act, but a holistic and
integrated pre-reflective experience. It is "the background
from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by
them."[26] We never merely perceive isolated senseimpressions, which are then formed into mental
representations or ideas. We can't even perceive such atomic,
isolated sensations because we can only see things as
"figures" against a "ground" and in relation to other "figures."
This ground is part of our embodied experience, prior to any
mental representation. It is the horizon which consists of our
previous experiences and future expectations.
This can be illustrated with the numerous Gestalt theory visual
experiments, where we experience certain properties of shapes
or colors differently from the way they are when being
measured "objectively." Drawing on his psychiatric practice,
Merleau-Ponty tried to illustrate this with the phenomenon of a
phantom limb. According to Merleau-Ponty, neither purely
physiological nor purely psychological accounts can ever
explain such a phenomenon. This is because they do not allow
for the presence of things other than in terms of
representation. They have, as he says, "no middle term
between presence and absence." In the case of a phantom leg,
however, there is no representation of the leg, but the
ambivalent presence of it in our body schema. It both is and
isn't. In other words, the body is fully present with us before
we have a representation of it.
Merleau-Ponty's point is to show that these perceptual
"mistakes" are not perceptual anomalies, but disclosures of the
way perception and consciousness normally work. Perception
is never a static affair, but an active, bodily involvement with
the world we live in. Intentionality, too, is not something
confined to consciousness, but goes "all the way down."
Reaching out my hand to pick something up does not consist
of two actions, first my thinking about the action and then my
arm responding to perform the action; it is one integrated
bodily performance. "Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing
through the intermediary of the body."[27] The body-subject
stands in an ongoing living dialogue and reciprocal relation
with her existential environment of which the symbols of
science are merely "a second-order expression."
For Merleau-Ponty, abstract science stands to the lived world
as geography stands to our rich, first-hand experience of the
fields and forests.
"My field of perception is constantly filled with a play of colors,
noises and fleeting tactile sensations which I cannot relate
precisely to the context of my clearly perceived world, yet
which I nevertheless immediately 'place' in the world, without
ever confusing them with my daydreams."[28]
Consciousness does not need to imply language. MerleauPonty held that "my body has its world, or understands its
world, without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or
'objectifying function.'"[29] Driving a car, playing an
instrument, and so forth all testify to the body's capacity to

find its way in the world, to judge distances, speed, touch,
pressure, positions, etc., without resorting to lingual or other
symbolic representation. Even speech should not be seen as a
separate act. It does not translate ready-made thought, but
accomplishes it. The speaker's speech is thought.
For Merleau-Ponty, this unity of the mental and the physical in
perception is exemplified in a work of art. Just as expressions
and gestures of the body are indistinguishable from what they
are perceived as expressing, so works of art or music cannot
be separated from what they express. In a picture, "the idea is
incommunicable by means other than the display of colors"
and in a piece of music "[t]he musical meaning of a sonata is
inseparable from the sounds which are its vehicle."[30] There
is no "idea" behind the work of art. The painter thinks with his
brush and paints. A paint brush or musical instrument
functions like a walking stick for a blind person, that is, as a
"bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis."[31]
Both language and painting are rooted in the primordial,
expressive gestures of the human body. I do not have a body,
"I am my body."
The artist lends his body to the world in an expressive gesture
in order to recapture that rich ambiguity that is present in prereflective experience and allows us to see the world afresh. For
Merleau-Ponty any theory of the body is, as such, therefore
always "already a theory of perception."[32] The philosophical
challenge is to give a proper account of this bodily perception.
For instance, when discussing the perception and affective
meaning of colors he notes: "We must rediscover how to live
these colors as our body does, that is, as peace or violence in
concrete form."[33] As mentioned earlier, such perception is
never a matter of discrete sensations but is always tied to the
character of the bearer of the color. A color is never merely a
color but always a color of something: "It is impossible to
completely describe the color of the carpet without saying that
it is a carpet, made of wool, and without implying in this color
a certain tactile value, a certain weight and a certain
resistance to sound."[34]
In other words, even if the red of the carpet "objectively"
reflects the same color as that of blood, we would
nevertheless experience the two kinds of red very differently,
both in terms of texture and, of course, in terms of
association. Conversely, we experience an object such as a
fountain pen as having the same color (black) even if the
reflection of the light gives certain parts a whitish radiance.
The real, what Merleau-Ponty interestingly calls the "moral"
color, remains constant despite these changes. Such a unity of
style has a synaesthetic value: "The brittleness, hardness,
transparency and crystal ring of glass all translate in a single
manner of being."[35] Quoting Cézanne, he observes: "A
picture contains within itself even the smell of the
landscape."[36] What all these observations from
Phenomenology of Perception make clear is that, for MerleauPonty, there was a strong analogy between phenomenology
and art. This analogy centers around the embodied nature of
the perceiving subject. There is no split between thinking and
expressing or (re)presenting, or, in the case of the artist, of
thinking before painting. Painting is thinking. Both perception
and artistic expression are thoroughly bodily affairs.

This same theme returns in a variety of forms in his three
essays on painting, "Cézanne's Doubt" (1945), "Indirect
Language and the Voices of Silence" (1952), and "Eye and
Mind" (1960). Merleau-Ponty recognized in Cézanne a similar
fascination with the realm where the self and the world fuse in
an embodied encounter. When he quotes Cézanne as saying:
"The landscape thinks itself in me, and I am its
consciousness," this reflected his own emphasis on the unity of
the subject and the object. This is evident in his still-lifes:
Since we normally perceive the world by moving around
instead of from one fixed point and by means of monocular
eye, as does a camera, Cézanne's objects are to be seen from
angles not normally perceived together. However, these
paintings render visible how we actually do experience things
in our lived encounter with them, something which is often
taken for granted.
In Eye and Mind, his last work before his death, he explained
how such paintings can help us relive that holistic, dynamic
way of perceiving the world: Unlike science, which has given
up living in things, painting, as much as phenomenology,
"draws on the fabric of brute meaning."[37] In the same work,
he observes: "From Lascaux to our time, pure or impure,
figurative or not, painting celebrates no other enigma but that
of visibility."[38] For Merleau-Ponty, both phenomenology and
art thus aim to offer an account of space, time, and the world
as we live them. For him, both make vision itself visible.[39]
5. Conclusions
As we have seen, both biologically based and
phenomenologically oriented theories have made substantial
and insightful contributions to our understanding of the role of
the body in the making and receiving of art. Darwinian and
socio-biological approaches to art are valuable corrections to
those theories that aim to explain art exclusively in terms of
their particular cultural-historical context. They are a salutary
reminder of the fact that, despite their immense historically
and culturally mediated diversity, art making and appreciation,
and the appreciation of beauty in general, have been and
continue to be an integral feature of almost every society and
can be considered a fundamental, if not universal dimension of
human existence. There are what Paul Crowther calls a set of
"flexible constants" in the long history of the making of art
that have their roots in a shared human nature, including its
biological dimension.
Turner and Cooke go so far as to argue that, like science, the
arts constitute an international language that can unite diverse
cultures because they deal with universal human values, such
as identity, justice, duty, social order, conflict, and peace.[40]
They also argue that, since artistic composition is an
alternative form of cognition, our aesthetic sensibility is closely
intertwined with our cognitive and moral capacities, if only,
they say, "because it is a useful guide to reproductive success
of the group."[41] Therefore, they see a close link between
truth, beauty, morality, and biological viability, a link not
normally encountered in traditional modernist aesthetics. In
that sense, aesthetics is still thoroughly dominated by a
Baumgartian and Kantian mindset, in which the so-called
higher senses of sight and hearing are traditionally considered

to belong to the mind rather than to the body.
In his book The Naked Artist: Art and Biology, the late British
Marxist art critic Peter Fuller described how, in the early
eighties he, together with a range of other Marxists, such as
Sebastiano Timparo and Raymond Williams, had come to
realize that where it concerned fundamental rhythms, shapes,
and colors, there can be "no reduction to simple [sic] social
and historical circumstances" and that "the material processes
of the making of art involve biological processes which can be,
and often are, the most powerful elements of the work."[42]
Fuller fully accepted Darwin's view that both animals and
humans have an innate and instinctive sense of the beautiful,
and that in animals this plays a significant role in courtship.
However, unlike Darwin and more like Langer, he stressed
that, although one can detect certain rudimentary versions or
proto-forms of this in animals, in humans these aesthetic
responses have undergone a particular process of symbolic
transformation. This transition reflects a difference between a
purely functional and an expressive role of the shapes, forms,
etc., as they are being responded to. In the evolution of
species, certain movement and patterns, for instance, lose
their specific practical function and can turn into expressive,
ritual, or ceremonial activities merely suggesting their original
functions.
Some workers' blues songs, for instance, might involve
stylized versions of rhythms and movements originally
belonging to the repetitive work on the fields. Even though
these rhythms have lost their original functional connection
with the task at hand, they nevertheless still resonate with and
suggest or "represent" the mood in which such practices took
place. Such suggestion and representation (depiction,
articulation, etc.) always involves a symbolic world. Put
differently, as symbolic phenomena, representations and
depictions always possess an "aboutness" character in which
some form of meaning is being articulated. This difference
between symbolic and non-symbolic entities also underlies the
difference between the scribbles of Morris' chimpanzees and
those of a child. Whereas at some stage a child can make the
surprise recognition that the circles, dots, and lines he or she
has been drawing can suddenly be perceived as a face, an ape
is unlikely ever to make such a leap.
This emphasis on the symbolic is, as we have seen, also
typical for Langer. In line with many psychoanalytic theories,
Langer not only recognized what Wollheim famously referred
to as humans' "seeing-in" capacity, but also realized that we
can project our own bodily feelings, whether fears, repulsions,
hopes, or desires, onto objects and shapes. Especially touch
and taste are telling in this respect, as humans seem to have
strong emotional reactions to certain kinds of textures - slimy,
sharp, etc., or tastes - sweet, sour, etc. Thus there is a much
closer affinity between our inner mental and outer sensible
worlds than traditional subject-object epistemologies generally
tend to allow. This, in turn, connects to Merleau-Ponty's views
of the body-subject. As he has shown us, human embodiment
is more than just biological functioning and surviving but
involves a complex web of culturally mediated embodied
encounters with the world, in the context of a perceptual field

and horizon that lends it its meaning. And this, finally, brings
us back to the role and nature of the arts.
Although Merleau-Ponty held that the body understands the
world without symbolically "objectifying" it, his notion of art as
an expression of the silent qualities of the Lebenswelt came
very close to Langer's notion of art as a non-discursive symbol
of such bodily understanding. Art, whether in Lascaux or the
Louvre, can capture this affective primordial contact with the
world that tends to get lost, both in the usual hum-drum
character of our day-to-day affairs, as well as in scientific
abstraction. However, in the aesthetic experience, humans
respond to forms, shapes, and colors in such a way that they
begin to take on a life of their own and open themselves up to
metaphoric meaning. For Merleau-Ponty, a style is a way of
inhabiting the world. Such a mode of being is the habituated
response to the nuances and secondary qualities offered by
the allusive logic of the world itself. Although Merleau-Ponty
did not use the term "aesthetic" in this context -- he did so
only twice in the entire Phenomenology of Perception -- his
notion of style seemed to come close to what one might call
the "aesthetic dimension" of life, i.e., the realm of what Langer
referred to as the "multimodal, yet nameless qualities" and
nuances. A painting can express such silent qualities only
indirectly and allusively.
Notwithstanding my great admiration and indebtedness to
Merleau-Ponty, I would nevertheless like to conclude with a
word of caution. As we have seen, for Merleau-Ponty there
was a close analogy between phenomenology and painting.
For him, the phenomenological attitude as adopted by
philosophers involved "the same kind of attentiveness and
wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to
seize the meaning of the world" as can be found in writers and
painters such as Balzac, Proust, Valéry and Cézanne.[43]
Elsewhere he states: "Philosophy is not the reflection of a preexisting truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into
being."[44]
By thus emphasizing the deep similarity between
phenomenology and art, he tended to absorb artistic vision
into the broader realm of pre-reflective, bodily senseexperience. However, and this is where my caution comes in,
not all embodied, lived experience is necessarily aesthetically
qualified: We can also have pre-theoretical experiences of
justice (fair and unfair), ethics (right or wrong), space (near or
far), and so on. To suggest that everything that escapes
discursive language or scientific formulation and articulation
therefore belongs to the artistic or aesthetic realm and vice
versa, merely perpetuates an unhealthy view of art versus
science and, by implication, a feeling or emotion versus
thinking dichotomy. In order to do proper justice to the artistic
and aesthetic, we will need a more nuanced and fine-grained
approach which, while building upon Merleau-Ponty's insights
on the role of the body in our encounter with the world, will
also be able to differentiate between different modes of such
encounters. Such a model will, while building on the insights of
the above thinkers, still have to address the ongoing question
of what, if anything, constitutes the unique and arguably
irreducible nature of the artistic or the aesthetic.

I have already hinted at some answer to this question by
drawing attention to Langer's emphasis on the way forms,
sounds, or textures can lend themselves to metaphoric
meaning. This is something neglected both in Darwinian
inclined socio-biological theories and in Merleau-Ponty. Making
vision itself visible is not necessarily an aesthetic project,
although it may very well be that too. We need to specify what
aspect of vision is thus made visible. I suggest that this needs
a further specification, one that has to do with such things as
affect, nuance, suggestion, and empathy. I propose that it is
the unique role of art to be able to articulate or symbolize the
world to the extent that it is affectively experienced. Put
differently, art responds to the shapes, forms, and rhythms in
the world to the extent that they can carry expressive
meaning that resonates with the way we affectively experience
the world .
In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty may well be right in saying that
art parallels phenomenology in being a means to "re-achieve a
direct and primitive contact with the world."[45] But that does
not mean that, asphilosophy and as art, they are the same as
having such contact. Although using a paintbrush may well feel
the same as using a car clutch or a walking stick, in that they
are all experienced as extensions of our body, using a
paintbrush does not necessarily constitute being involved in
the process of producing art. Indeed, we may well be
varnishing our doors or fences. Driving a car and varnishing a
door are not as such symbolic actions; they are not meant to
articulate meaning or invite other people's interpretation
(leaving aside what my neighbor might think!). They are just
certain actions leading to specific ends. By contrast, art and
philosophy are symbolic practices; they have an 'aboutness'
character that driving a car lacks. Whether implicit or explicit,
unlike painting houses or bridges, symbolic practices always
invite to a hermeneutic response. In addition, painting pictures
and creating sculptures are specifically aesthetic modes of
symbolic transformation; they are articulations of the world as
affectively experienced and lend themselves to metaphoric
interpretation and understanding.
In summary, both biological and phenomenological theories
can make a significant contribution to a better understanding
of the embodied nature of art on the following two conditions:
First, even if art contributes not only to general human wellbeing but also to sexual and natural selection and thus to the
biological continuation of the species, its role and importance
in life should never be reduced to meeting biological needs.
Second, even though the making of and responding to art can
involve habitually embodied actions and reactions,
nevertheless these should always be recognized as symbolic
practices and therefore as open to human interpretation and
metaphoric understanding within the context of a broader
horizon that lends them their meaning. With those two
provisos, I suggest that both biological and phenomenological
philosophies of art can continue to open up promising new
avenues for a deeper understanding of the embodied nature of
art.
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